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Unpacking cyberterrorism discourse: 
Specificity, status and scale in news media constructions of 
threat 
 
Abstract 
This article explores original empirical findings from a research project investigating representations of 
cyberterrorism in the international news media. Drawing on a sample of 535 items published by 31 outlets 
between 2008 and 2013, it focuses on four questions. First, how individuated a presence is cyberterrorism 
given within news media coverage? Second, how significant a threat is cyberterrorism deemed to pose? 
Third, how is the identity of ‘cyberterrorists’ portrayed? And, fourth, who or what is identified as the 
referent – that which is threatened – within this coverage? The article argues that constructions of 
specificity, status and scale play an important, yet hitherto under-explored, role within articulations of 
concern about the threat posed by cyberterrorism. Moreover, unpacking news coverage of cyberterrorism 
in this way leads to a more variegated picture than that of the vague and hyperbolic media discourse often 
identified by critics. The article concludes by pointing to several promising future research agendas to 
build on this work. 
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Introduction 
Although it is a relatively new concept,
1
 recent years have witnessed a significant 
growth of academic and political interest in cyberterrorism. Within the scholarly 
literature – in common with terrorism research more broadly2 – two discussions have 
been particularly prominent. First, is the question of definition. Although Dorothy 
Denning’s relatively narrow understanding of cyberterrorism remains the best-known 
and most widely-used,
3
 considerable debate continues around the respective merits of 
                                                          
1
 The origins of the term cyberterrorism are typically located in the mid-1980s, see for example: 
Barry Collin, ‘The future of cyberterrorism’, Criminal Justice International, 13:2 (1997), pp. 15–18. 
2
 For an overview of issues around the definition of terrorism, see Alex P. Schmid, ‘The 
Definition of Terrorism’, in Alex P. Schmid (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 39-98. For recent contributions to debate on the definition of terrorism, 
compare: Anthony Richard, ‘Conceptualizing Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37:3 (2014), 
pp. 213-236; Gilbert Ramsey, ‘Why Terrorism Can, but should not be Defined’, Critical Studies on 
Terrorism, 8:2 (2015), pp. 211-228. For an engaging discussion on the issues around the threat posed by 
terrorism, compare Mueller’s ‘six rather unusual propositions’ article with the responses from Richard 
Betts, Daniel Byman and Martha Crenshaw in the same issue of Terrorism and Political Violence: John 
Mueller, ‘Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 17:4 
(2005), pp. 487-505. 
3
 Denning described cyberterrorism thus: “Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and 
cyberspace. It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, 
3 
 
restrictive and flexible conceptualisations of this term.
4
 The second prominent debate 
relates to the threat posed by cyberterrorism to various referents including, inter alia, 
national security, corporations, and ordinary citizens.
5
  
Concerned assessments of the cyberterrorism threat highlight infrastructural and 
socio-political vulnerabilities at risk of exploitation by appropriately resourced and 
intentioned actors. Approached thus, cyberterrorism emerges as a relatively 
                                                                                                                                                                          
networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its 
people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack 
should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. 
Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe 
economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of 
cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a 
costly nuisance would not”. See: Dorothy E. Denning, Cyberterrorism. Testimony before the Special 
Oversight Panel on Terrorism Committee on Armed Services US House of Representatives. Washington, 
Washington D.C., May 2000. 
4
 Compare, for example: Sarah Gordon, and Richard Ford, ‘Cyberterrorism?’, Computers & 
Security 21:7 (2002), pp. 636-647; Maura Conway, ‘Reality Bytes: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist ‘use’ of 
the Internet’, First Monday, 7:11 (2002); Dorothy Denning, ‘A View of Cyberterrorism Five Years 
Later’, in Kenneth Himma (ed.), Internet Security: Hacking, Counterhacking, and Society (London: Jones 
and Bartlett Publishers, 2007), pp. 123-140; Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald, ‘What is cyberterrorism? 
Findings from a survey of researchers’, Terrorism and Political Violence, online first (2014), pp. 1-22. 
5
 For an overview, see: Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald, and Lella Nouri, ‘The Cyberterrorism 
Threat: Findings from a Survey of Researchers’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37:1 (2014), pp. 68-90. 
4 
 
straightforward danger of potentially catastrophic significance. Hyperbolic scenarios are 
widespread here, especially the risk of a ‘Digital Pearl Harbour’: ‘a debilitating, full-
scale digital assault - in which multiple attacks are launched against telecommunications 
networks, city power grids, and/or air traffic control systems, causing widespread 
destruction and possible loss of life’.6  Such scenarios point, first, to the widespread 
construction of cyberterrorism as a generalised and homogeneous threat within this 
‘concerned’ literature: a threat that remains insufficiently unpacked within academic – 
as much as media – analysis. And, second, to the importance of figurative language 
within the framing of this threat. As with terrorism discourse more broadly
7
, metaphors 
employed to make sense of cyberterrorism work to (re)produce that to which they 
appear to refer, often with tangible discursive and political implications:  
Metaphors matter. We choose our words from within a dominant system or frame of metaphor 
that offers us a specific lexicon of language, that defines words in certain specific ways, and 
shapes both the “what” and the “how” of our communication. In this way, figuratively and often 
literally, through metaphor we make meaning. Our most common metaphors help us to 
understand problems and conflicts in certain ways, offering us certain available responses, and 
                                                          
6
 John D. Podesta and Raj Goyle, ‘Lost in cyberspace? Finding American liberties in a 
dangerous digital world’, Yale Law and Policy Review, 27:5 (2005), p. 516. 
7
 See: Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). 
5 
 
negating or obscuring others. Metaphor operates in the realm of thought, but its workings 
reverberate in concrete, active, tangible ways.
8
 
 
Less troubled analyses of the cyberterrorism threat, in contrast, tend to justify a 
more sceptical stance through cost-benefit analysis,
9
 or via inductive reasoning from 
existing knowledge of the likelihood and consequences of offline terrorist attacks.10  A 
common – although not universal – theme within these more sceptical assessments of 
the cyberterrorism threat is the importance of discursive renderings thereof. That is, for 
a number of authors, constructions of the danger posed by cyberterrorism themselves 
help to constitute or create this phenomenon as a significant and urgent security 
challenge. Cyberterrorism, in other words, might be thought of as a social construction 
rather than an extra-discursive reality: its existence is (at least in part) a product of 
                                                          
8
 Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills (2009) At war with metaphor: Media, propaganda, and racism 
in the War on Terror. Plymouth: Lexington Books, p. 3. 
9
 Compare Giampiero Giacomello, ‘Bangs for the buck: A cost-benefit analysis of 
cyberterrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27:5 (2004), pp. 387-408 with Turki Al-Garni and 
Thomas M. Chen, ‘An updated cost-benefit view of cyberterrorism’, in Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and 
Tom Chen (eds.), Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology (Abingdon, Routledge, 2015), pp. 72-
85. 
10
 Maura Conway, ‘Reality check: assessing the (un) likelihood of cyberterrorism’, in Tom Chen, 
Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald (eds.), Cyberterrorism: Understanding, Assessment and Response 
(Springer, New York, NY, 2014), pp. 103-121. 
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meaning-making practices associated, variously, with political rhetoric, popular culture, 
cyber-security corporations, or the news media.
11
 As Francois Debrix argues, comparing 
contemporary representations of cyberterrorism with the ‘techno-strategic’ nuclear 
weapons discourse explored in Carol Cohn’s12 pioneering Cold War study: 
 
The language of cyberterrorism mobilized by the media and its so-called experts is quite 
technical for sure. But this technicality, far from de-realizing the threat, makes it possible. It 
realizes it in the mind/psyche of the public who is subjected to the simulated scenarios and 
mediations. The taxonomy of cyberterrorism and its technocratic language allow the public to 
recognize that there is a threat, and that this threat, as presented to them by the media, will surely 
cause serious casualties within the population.
13
 
 
For Myriam Dunn Cavelty, more forcefully: 
 
                                                          
11
 Maura Conway, ‘The Media and Cyberterrorism: A Study in the Construction of ‘Reality’’, 
(2008). Available: http://doras.dcu.ie/2142/1/2008–5.pdf (accessed 5 January 2016); Gabriel Weimann, 
‘Cyberterrorism: The sum of all fears?’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:2 (2005), pp. 129-149. 
12
 Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals’, Signs, 12:4 (1987), 
pp. 687-718. 
13
 Francois Debrix, ‘Cyberterror and media-induced fears: the production of emergency culture’, 
Strategies: Journal of Theory, Culture & Politics, 14:1 (2001), pp. 149-168, 164. 
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While governments and the media repeatedly distribute information about cyber-threats, real 
cyber-attacks resulting in deaths and injuries remain largely the stuff of Hollywood movies or 
conspiracy theory. In fact, menacing scenarios of major disruptive occurrences in the cyber-
domain, triggered by malicious actors, have remained just that – scenarios.14 
 
Analyses such as these are important for two reasons. First, they indicate the 
pervasiveness and prominence of (representations of) ‘cyberterrorism’ across diverse 
social, political and cultural sites – from Hollywood movies to political language, media 
coverage and beyond. Second, they also serve to open significant new research 
questions beyond those surrounding the issues of definition and threat noted above. 
These include questions around the content, framing and reception of (various) 
‘cyberterrorism’ discourse(s), as well as the constitutive or causal power such 
discourses might possess.
15
  
This article builds on this work on constructions of cyberterrorism, approaching 
representations of the definition, threat and characteristics of cyberterrorism as vital to 
its emergence as an object of knowledge. Specifically, it offers a detailed empirical 
                                                          
14
 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, ‘Cyber-terror—looming threat or phantom menace? The framing of 
the US cyber-threat debate’, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 4:1 (2008), pp. 19-36, 20. 
15
 See, for example: Ralf Bendrath, Johan Eriksson, and Giampiero Giacomello, ‘From 
‘cyberterrorism’ to ‘cyberwar’, back and forth’, in Johan Erikson and Giampiero Giacomello (eds.), 
International Relations and Security in the Digital Age (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 57-82. 
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analysis of an original research sample of 535 items published by thirty-one 
international news media outlets between 2008 and 2013. This analysis extends this 
work above by focusing attention on the considerable – and often overlooked – 
variances in (news media) constructions of this threat and the importance of these via 
investigation of four research questions that emerge from the above debates on 
definition and danger. First, how individuated a presence does cyberterrorism occupy 
within news coverage making mention of this threat? For instance, does cyberterrorism 
receive sustained, differentiated analysis within relevant news items, or is it collocated 
with other cyber-security challenges or, indeed, other types of terrorism when it is 
discussed? Second, how significant a threat is cyberterrorism deemed to pose? Is the 
news media dominated by ‘concerned’ or ‘sceptical’ portrayals of this phenomenon, and 
are there variances across time or space? Third, how are ‘cyberterrorists’ identified 
within this coverage? Are they, for instance, portrayed as professional or amateur, as 
politically motivated, as non-state actors, and so on? And, fourth, who or what is 
positioned as the referent – the entity threatened by cyberterrorism? Does the perceived 
vulnerability of particular actors or infrastructures feature more prominently in the news 
media than others?
16
   
                                                          
16
 Research question two, three and four all involved coding the news stories for threat 
assessment, type of actor and referent object.  This coding was done in relation to the particular emphasis 
of the news piece being analysed.  This did mean that there was a certain degree of blurring between one 
9 
 
 Our analysis of these questions is intended to make two immediate contributions 
to existing scholarship. The first is to add empirical detail to relevant literature on 
cyberterrorism and cybersecurity more broadly. Although numerous scholars have 
highlighted the importance of news media discourse in relation to this threat,
17
 this 
study is the first of its size to be focused specifically on constructions of cyberterrorism. 
As detailed in the conclusion, our findings open considerable space for further research, 
including comparative analysis of different media. The article’s second contribution is 
to add analytical depth to existing accounts of the content and framing of cyberterrorism 
discourse. To do this, we focus our analysis on three factors which, in our sample, 
intervened in media assessments of the threat posed by cyberterrorists. These are: (i) 
specificity – referring to the degree of individuated attention afforded to cyberterrorism 
within a particular news item; (ii) status – the type of actor positioned as a would-be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
category and another and while objectivity was not possible as part of this process the categories do serve 
to highlight how threats are framed in news media coverage. 
17
 Lorraine Bowman-Grieve, ‘“Cyber-terrorism and Moral Panics: A reflection on the discourse 
of cyberterrorism’, in Tom Chen, Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald (eds.), Terrorism Online: Politics, Law 
and Technology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 86-106; Maura Conway, ‘Cyberterrorism: Media 
Myth or Clear and Present Danger?”,’ in Jones Irwin (ed.) War and Virtual War: The Challenges to 
Communities (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004), pp. 79-98; Michael Stohl, ‘Cyber terrorism: a 
clear and present danger, the sum of all fears, breaking point or patriot games?’, Crime, law and social 
change, 46:4-5 (2006), pp. 223-238. 
10 
 
cyberterrorist; and, iii) scale – the size of referent threatened by cyberterrorism. As 
demonstrated below, anxiety about the threat posed by cyberterrorism tends to increase 
with the level of individuated attention afforded to this phenomenon in a particular news 
item. Moreover, particular constructions of cyberterrorists – as either professional or 
unskilled actors – and geographically larger referents – especially ‘the West’ or the 
entire globe – are also associated with heightened levels of concern than their 
counterparts. As this suggests, our research points to a far more fractured, 
heterogeneous and variegated cyberterrorism discourse than is frequently identified by 
critics of media hyperbole in this context; a discourse in which variations matter a great 
deal. Indeed, as shown below, the most apprehensive media assessments of 
cyberterrorism tend to draw upon a very specific construction of cyberterrorism as the 
activity of either professionals or unskilled actors targeted at ‘the West’ or the entire 
world. These constructions also, importantly, typically differentiate cyberterrorism from 
other threats such as cyberwar, and draw heavily upon perceived sources of 
authoritative expertise from industry, politics or academia. 
 
Constructing (cyber)terrorism 
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a diverse, broadly constructivist, 
literature which seeks to excavate, situate, and deconstruct the diverse ways in which 
11 
 
the phenomenon of terrorism has been discursively produced.
18
 Associated with, but 
extending beyond, so-called ‘critical terrorism studies’,19 this work has demonstrated 
the significance of film, television shows, video games, executive political speech, 
legislative debate, the news media, and much else besides to explore how terrorism: “as 
a social fact…comes into being within, and is dependent upon, the contextual, historical 
and political dynamics that structure its interpretation thus”.20 The point of this research, 
as Stump and Dixit argue, is not to question whether terrorism – or, here, cyberterrorism 
– exists. Rather, to shift the analyst’s gaze from (cyber)terrorism as brute material 
reality to ‘(cyber)terrorism’ as discursive production, in order: ‘…to study how 
representations of terrorism and their reality are socially produced through linguistic 
and non-linguistic practices.’ As they continue, ‘Explaining terrorism, to borrow from 
                                                          
18
 See, amongst many others: Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, 
Politics and Counterterrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Stuart Croft, Culture, 
Crisis and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Carol K. Winkler, 
In The Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence (New York, NY: SUNY, 2006); Lisa 
Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented ‘Terrorism' (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
19
 Jeroen Gunning, ‘A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?’, Government and Opposition, 42:3 
(2007), pp. 363-393; Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, (eds.) Critical terrorism 
studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
20
 Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen Smyth, Terrorism: A Critical 
Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), p.119. 
12 
 
Jonathan Potter, is not a matter of ‘denying the existence of tables’ or terrorists, but 
rather a matter of ‘exploring the various ways in which their reality is constructed and 
undermined’.21  
 In common with other constructivist work on security, it is the constitutivity of 
competing claims relating to terrorism that is emphasised within this literature.
22
 The 
multitude of different definitions and understandings of terrorism that are observable 
across a wide array of discursive spaces have a productive effect as opposed to one that 
is merely reflective or descriptive. That is, the threat of terrorism, as well as the identity 
‘terrorist’, are not made with reference to some extra-discursive, objective ‘reality’ of 
terrorism; they are, rather, created through such assertions (albeit with variable levels of 
stability). Importantly, such attempts to secure the meaning of terrorism are themselves 
also: situated in specific etymological and other genealogies; dependent on various 
intertextual relations; made manifest through identifications of similarity and difference 
between terrorism and other risks; and situated in a diverse range of (open, yet 
contested) social and cultural contexts. Terrorism and other security issues are, 
                                                          
21
 Jacob L. Stump and Priya Dixit, ‘Toward a completely constructivist critical terrorism 
studies’, International Relations, 26: 2 (2012), pp. 199-217, 210. 
22
 See: Charlotte Epstein, “Constructivism or the eternal return of universals in International 
Relations. Why returning to language is vital to prolonging the owl’s flight”, European Journal of 
International Relations, 19:3 (2013), pp. 399-519. 
13 
 
therefore, not a ‘given’23 but instead a discursive and social production. Any effort to 
define terrorism, or to assess the severity of the threat that it poses, do so at the expense 
of overlooking the constructed and contingent character of this phenomenon.
24
 
Approached thus, the task for analysts is not to explore the accuracy of dominant 
discourses on (cyber)terrorism, nor even to explore their causal impact upon 
policymaking in the ‘real world’. Rather, it is to describe and unpack the material from 
which such discourses are created and to highlight moments of instability, paradox, 
contradiction and heterogeneity therein.
25
  
 This article furthers this research by presenting findings from a discursive 
analysis of a corpus of news media items on cyberterrorism published across a total of 
thirty-one different media outlets between 1 January 2008 and 8 June 2013. This sample 
included media hosted in Australia, China, India, Russia, Singapore, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, and spanned broadsheet newspapers, tabloid 
                                                          
23
 See, for example, Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, “Securitisation and Diego Garcia”, 
Review of International Studies, 39:4 (2013), pp. 815-834. 
24
 Eva Herschinger, “A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN Debates on 
a Definition of International Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 25: 2 (2013), pp. 183-201, 
184. 
25
 See, Richard K. Ashley and Rob BJ Walker. "Conclusion: reading dissidence/writing the 
discipline: crisis and the question of sovereignty in international studies", International Studies Quarterly 
34:3 (1990), pp. 367-416, p.384. 
14 
 
newspapers, and the websites of media production companies.
26
 These media outlets 
were selected for a combination of purposive factors which included: accessibility to the 
researchers, including the presence of an internal online archive of content; diversity of 
political perspective and type of media corporation, given that concerns around privacy 
and liberty are particularly prominent within cybersecurity discourse; total size of 
readership, where possible favouring publications with the highest circulation figures; 
diversity of geographical origin in order to facilitate international comparison; and 
language, such that the news content was provided in the medium of English.
27
 The 
corpus of news items identified across this sample was subsequently generated via a key 
word search for the terms <cyber terrorism>, <cyberterrorism> and <cyber terror> on 
                                                          
26
 The thirty-one sources were: ABC News, al Aljazeera, The Australian, Australian Financial 
Review, The Australian Telegraph, BBC, Boston Globe, Channel 4 News, China Daily, CNN, Daily 
Mail, Financial Times, Fox News, The Guardian, The Herald Sun, The Independent, LA Times, The New 
York Times, Reuters, Russia Today, Sky News, South China Morning Post, The Straits Times, The Sun, 
The Sydney Morning Herald, The Telegraph, The Times of India, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, 
The Washington Post, The West Australian. 
27
 For explicit comparative analysis between media corporations and across national borders, 
please see Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Andrew Whiting, “Constructing cyberterrorism as a security 
threat: a study of international news media coverage”, Perspectives on Terrorism 9:1 (2015), pp. 60-75. 
and Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Andrew Whiting, “Analogy and authority in cyberterrorism 
discourse: An analysis of global news media coverage”, Global Society (2016).  
15 
 
the internal search engines of these sites, where possible.
28
 This established a total of 
535 relevant items for analysis. As detailed further below, these items varied 
considerably, and included news articles on current affairs, technology stories, opinion 
pieces, editorial discussion, and analysis of cultural events, including reviews of 
fictional depictions representations of cyberterrorism.
29
 
2008 and 2013 were fixed as the parameters for this research for two reasons. 
First, because this provided us with sufficient data through which to explore 
developments within media discourse on cyberterrorism: a total of 1986 days of content. 
Second, because this period also incorporated a number of potentially relevant events 
that attracted considerable media interest as they unfolded.
30
 These events included the 
cyber-attacks on Georgia that took place in the summer of 2008; the 2010 identification 
                                                          
28
 Where possible this research used internal search engines in order to better understand the 
original presentation of news items around cyberterrorism (including the positioning of photographs, use 
of sub-headings, and so forth). Where this was not possible – for reasons including institutional 
subscription and temporal limits on results from internal search engines – we employed LexisNexis. 
29
 For instance, cyberterrorism featured prominently in discussion and reviews on the twenty-
third film in the James Bond franchise, Skyfall, which was released at the end of 2012. 
30
 As one anonymous reviewer helpfully noted, there is certainly scope here for further research 
on news media coverage both prior and subsequent to our sample. Such research would incorporate 
reportage on other potentially relevant events such as the 2007 attacks in Estonia, or the 2015 attack 
against the French broadcaster TV5Monde. 
16 
 
of the Stuxnet attack against nuclear centrifuges in Iran; the 2010 publication of the 
UK’s National Security Strategy in which cybersecurity threats occupied a place of 
prominence, and the subsequent release of the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting 
and Promoting the UK in a Digital World in 2011. Following data collection, each of 
the 535 news items was coded for relevant descriptive information and for thematic 
analysis.
31
 These categories were generated from the project’s research questions as 
well as iteratively via a preliminary reading of our data. 
 
News media representations of cyberterrorism  
                                                          
31
 The descriptive information identified was as follows: (i) Publication title; (ii) Online only 
publication?; (iii) Date of publication; (iv) URL; (v) Country of publication; (vi) Article headline; (vii) 
Article length; and, (viii) Accompanying imagery? The thematic analysis involved coding for the 
following: (i) What type of piece is the news item (for example is it a discussion of current affairs or a 
technology blog)?; (ii) What is the geographical focus of the item?; (iii) What, if any, background 
knowledge around cyberterrorism or cyber-security is assumed?; (iv) Is a specific cyber event mentioned, 
and if so what?; (v) Is a specific non-cyber event mentioned, and if so what?; (vi) Is cyberterrorism the 
primary or secondary focus, or only mentioned in passing?; (vii) How is cyberterrorism depicted (for 
example, is a narrow or broad understanding evident)?; (viii) To what is cyberterrorism compared or 
contrasted?; (ix) Are sources cited, and if so whom or what?; (x) What referents are posited in the news 
item? (xi) How concerned is the item about the cyberterrorism threat?; (xii) How are cyberterrorists 
represented? (xiii) What subject position is the reader invited to inhabit?; (xiv) Is there any other 
information of interest or relevance? 
17 
 
As noted above, each of the 535 news items identified in our research sample was coded 
according to the extent of its focus on cyberterrorism as an individuated concern. 400 of 
these items had a primary or secondary focus on cyberterrorism (see Table 1). Items 
with a primary focus were those that concentrated exclusively or principally on the issue 
of cyberterrorism (however defined);
32
 items with a secondary focus paid attention to 
this phenomenon without it constituting a main focus of the piece.
33
 Those categorised 
as ‘other’ mentioned cyberterrorism at some point, but lacked any level of engagement 
with this concept sufficient for meaningful analysis.
34
  
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
                                                          
32
 For example: Newscore, ‘Al Qaeda’s ‘cyber jihad’ to target social networking sites’, Fox 
News, July 13 2011, available at: {http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/07/13/terrorists-announce-cyber-
jihad-targeting-social-networking-sites-in-west.html} accessed January 5 2016. 
33
 For example: Kevin Rudd, ‘Just a mouse click away from war,’ The Telegraph, September 19 
2011, available at: {http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/opinion/just-a-mouse-click-away-from-
war/story-e6frezz0-1226140275845?nk=db62392fbe69ea158a1f9c79b4e30dd3} accessed January 5 
2016. 
34
 For example: Ted Regencia, ‘Obama and Romney faulted for china-bashing’, Aljazeera, 
October 22 2012, available at: 
{http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/10/2012102112493282290.html} accessed January 5 
2016. 
18 
 
The 400 news items with cyberterrorism as a primary or secondary focus were 
subsequently categorised according to the level of concern each exhibited about the 
cyberterrorism threat. Six different levels of concern were identified following a 
detailed, immersive reading, characterised as: concerned; concerned, with elements of 
scepticism; balanced; sceptical; sceptical, with elements of concern; and, neither. 
A story was coded as concerned or sceptical if it was characterised by a clearly 
identifiable stance on the threat posed by cyberterrorism, offering no space for 
consideration of alternative perspectives. Examples of the former include Jemima Kiss’ 
article for the UK’s Guardian newspaper, which cites Eugene Kaspersky’s connection 
of the Stuxnet virus to ‘three incidents of cyber-terrorism’ and concludes that things ‘are 
only going to get worse’.35 Joseph S. Nye’s 2011 article in The New York Times, 
similarly, cites ex-NSA director Mike McConnell’s assessment that ‘Sooner or later, 
terror groups will achieve cyber-sophistication. It’s like nuclear proliferation, only far 
easier’,36 without challenge from competing voices. As chart 1 demonstrates, two-thirds 
(67%) of the 400 news items in our study demonstrated a distinctively “concerned” 
                                                          
35
 Jemima Kiss, ‘Future cyber attacks could prove catastrophic, say online security experts’, The 
Guardian, January 21 2013, available at: {http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/21/future-
cyber-threats-catastrophic-dld-2013} accessed January 5 2016. 
36
 Mike McConnell, cited in Joseph S. Nye, ‘Cyberspace wars’, The New York Times, February 
27 2011, available at: {http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/28/opinion/28iht-ednye28.html?_r=1&} 
accessed January 5 2016.  
19 
 
perspective on cyberterrorism. In stark contrast, only 2% of coverage across this time 
period took an explicitly sceptical stance toward this threat. Examples of these minority 
views included Duncan Campbell’s 2009 piece in The Guardian, which approached 
Gary McKinnon’s potential extradition to the United States as a product of misplaced 
fears over cyberterrorism in the post-9/11 period.
37
 Another article in the same 
newspaper by Glenn Greenwald (writing prior to the Edward Snowden revelations) 
similarly sought to contest Leon Panetta’s assertion that extremist groups armed with 
“cyber tools” could gain control of “critical switches” to cause catastrophic disruption, 
arguing:
38
 
 
This massive new expenditure of money is not primarily devoted to defending against 
cyber-aggressors. The US itself is the world's leading cyber-aggressor. A major purpose of this 
expansion is to strengthen the US's ability to destroy other nations with cyber-attacks.
39
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Stories coded as either concerned with elements of scepticism or sceptical with elements 
of concern evidenced a dominant narrative while also providing space to a rival 
interpretation. 8% of items in our sample were concerned with elements of scepticism, 
with only 1% categorised as sceptical with elements of concern. An example of the 
former is Tim McDonald’s 2010 piece for ABC News Australia which reports that 
governments are on alert for the threat of cyberterrorism.
40
 Whilst reflections from the 
UK’s former Foreign Secretary William Hague are cited to bolster this perspective,41 
the story concludes by citing Bill Gates’ opinion that – with an appropriate 
governmental approach – cyberterrorism ‘shouldn't be something that people will have 
to worry about’.42 Karen Greenberg’s 2012 piece for Aljazeera, in contrast, was clearly 
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sceptical about the significance of this threat, albeit while demonstrating elements of 
concern. This article’s primary focus concerned how the language of cyber-defence 
(including the lexicon of counterterrorism) facilitates encroachment on civil liberties. At 
the same time, Greenberg does not reject the possibility of genuine cyber-threats 
outright, conceding that ‘potential attacks, according to leading cyber experts, are 
possible’.43 
Balanced coverage was characterised by the presence of competing narratives 
over the cyberterrorism threat and the absence of any definitive conclusion about the 
plausibility of these. For example, a Russia Today article from 2012 pays significant 
attention to the concerns of American security professionals about cyberterrorism before 
subsequently exploring the views of more sceptical ‘experts’.44 As chart 1 demonstrates, 
7% of items across this time period took a balanced approach to the cyberterrorism 
threat. Finally, a story was categorised as neither if it discussed cyberterrorism but 
refrained from offering any clear assessment on the threat thereof. The UK’s Daily 
Mail, for example, reported on Pakistan’s introduction of new laws to combat 
                                                          
43
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cyberterrorism without reflection on their need or utility.
45
 15% of items in our sample 
fit into this category. 
 
[Insert chart 1 here] 
 
As the above suggests, three-quarters of the news items examined in our research 
expressed concern toward the threat posed by cyberterrorism, with only a small 
proportion of these qualifying this with competing, sceptical perspectives. Importantly, 
as table 2 shows, the levels of concern about cyberterrorism varied according to the 
specificity of the coverage. Thus, 75% of the items which focussed primarily on 
cyberterrorism were concerned (compared to 65% for those with cyberterrorism as their 
secondary focus), and a further 11% were classed as concerned with elements of 
scepticism (compared to 8% for those with cyberterrorism as their secondary focus). In 
other words, levels of concern increased where there was a specific focus on 
cyberterrorism. 
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[Insert table 2 here]  
 
Who are the cyberterrorists? 
Within the 400 news items that concentrated on cyberterrorism as their primary or 
secondary focus, 219 articles offered specific representations of the identity of 
cyberterrorists. Five distinct identity types were present in our sample: hackers; 
hacktivists; professionals; unskilled; and, unspecified non-state actors.
46
  When an item 
contained more than one of these representations,
47
 each of these was analysed 
separately. 
The first four of these representations are distinguished by the actor’s skill level 
and/or motivation. Hacker referred to depictions of cyberterrorists as individuals who 
are likely to employ computer techniques to cause disruption and interference to a 
particular target, but who lack either the skill or motivation to cause serious levels of 
                                                          
46
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damage to the most critical systems. Website defacement and Distributed Denial of 
Service Attacks (DDoS) are techniques that were often associated with this 
representation of cyberterrorists, as opposed to the writing and dissemination of 
complex malware, for instance. A good example of this may be identified in a 2009 
story written for The Independent that covered a recent ‘cyber terror blitz’ and the 
likelihood that ‘Russian hackers’ were to blame for temporarily shutting down Twitter 
and causing major slowdowns to Facebook and Livejournal through the use of DDoS.
48
  
Whilst the term hacker was used to refer to individuals, the term hacktivist refers 
to refer coverage of groups or their members which self-identify as collectives with a 
shared objective, such as Anonymous, AntiSec and LulzSec. A 2012 Russia Today 
article, for example, in which cyberterrorists were categorised as hacktivist reported on 
the group Anonymous under the heading “Protesters or Terrorists?”.49 Professionals 
referred to stories focused on individuals with sufficient levels of knowledge of 
complex computer techniques to be able to target the most critical systems. For 
example, in a story outlining how the U.S. is looking to protect itself against future 
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cyber-attack through the development of a virtual ‘cyber city’, Leon E. Panetta asserts 
that malicious actors (including terrorists) can target vulnerabilities in critical 
infrastructure to create destruction comparable to the September 11
th
 2001 attacks.
50
  
Unskilled referred to representations of individuals who employed either 
already-available scripts or publically available platforms and software to commit acts 
deemed “cyberterrorist” in this coverage. A 2011 BBC article, for example, reported on 
two Mexican individuals who had sent out phoney tweets alleging that shootings and 
kidnappings were taking place at a local school. The actions entailed no technical 
expertise, yet the use of this social networking platform in this way caused panic and 
accidents, and was later labelled “Twitter terrorism”.51 Given the manner in which both 
state and non-state actors were deemed capable of cyberterrorism in much of this media, 
a final category – unspecified non-state actors – acknowledged representations that said 
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little about an individual’s skill or motivation but explicitly identified the purported 
cyberterrorist as entirely unaffiliated with a state.
52
 
As table 3 demonstrates, the most common representation of cyberterrorists in 
our sample was as professionals (n=118), followed by hackers (n=77). For the three 
most common representations, table 2 also shows subtotals for whether the 
cyberterrorist was presented as a state or non-state actor. These subtotals show that, 
even when represented as professionals, cyberterrorists were more likely to be portrayed 
as non-state, than state, actors. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 builds on this analysis by examining whether levels of concern intensified when 
cyberterrorists were represented in a particular way. For each representation of the 
cyberterrorist, it shows the proportion of stories that fell within the six categories used 
to measure concern introduced above.
53
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[Insert table 4 here] 
 
Four findings of note emerge from this analysis of news media representations of the 
identity of cyberterrorists. First, levels of concern were higher when items contained 
discernible representations of cyberterrorists. For those items which included an explicit 
representation of this threat’s identity, 84% were either concerned or concerned with 
elements of scepticism. This figure was 19% lower for those items which contained no 
such representation. So, again, greater specificity was associated with higher levels of 
concern. 
Second, in addition to specificity, status also had an important bearing on 
concern levels. Of the four representations based on an actor’s level of skill and 
motivation (hacker/hacktivist/professional/unskilled), “Professionals” was not only the 
most common but also the one with the greatest levels of concern. 75% of the stories 
representing cyberterrorists as professionals were categorised as concerned, with a 
further 12% classed as concerned with elements of scepticism. Indeed, none of the items 
representing cyberterrorists thus displayed any level of scepticism. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, the “Unskilled” representation also had above-average levels of concern. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
more than one representation of cyberterrorists, some items appear more than once in this table and so the 
figures in the total column do not tally exactly with the figures in chart 1. 
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As with “Professionals”, 87% of the items which portrayed cyberterrorists as unskilled 
were classified as either concerned or concerned with elements of scepticism. Unlike 
the “Professionals” construction, however, a small number of items containing the 
unskilled representation were classified as sceptical (5%).  
Third, the small number of items (n=7) which represented cyberterrorists as 
“Unspecified non-state actors” were all classified as concerned. These items were all 
characterised by an attempt to locate the concept of cyberterrorism in the context of a 
wider threat setting which included either offline terrorist (and in our sample, 
specifically, jihadist) groups
54
 – most frequently Al Qaeda55 – hostile states,56 or past 
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examples of cyberattacks, particularly Stuxnet.
57
 Because of this wider concern, only 
one of these seven items had a primary focus on cyberterrorism.  
Fourth, items representing hacktivists as cyberterrorists had the lowest levels of 
concern. Only two of the six items containing this representation were classified as 
concerned, each of which featured industry expert Eugene Kaspersky.
58
 In a 2012 article 
by Lee Taylor in The Australian Telegraph, for instance, Kaspersky asserts that 
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cyberterrorism is a logical progression for the “leaders” of hacktivist collectives such as 
Anonymous: 
 
Most hacktivists – not all of them – are just following orders from the leaders, but many of these 
leaders are professional people and this is really dangerous…[T]hey can grow to the terrorist 
level.
59
 
 
The other item, in the Australian Financial Review, reported on how the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) has monitored ‘with mounting alarm’ groups 
such as Anonymous which have ‘targeted Western nations and companies with 
disruptive attacks that foreshadow an apocalyptic fusion between cyber-capabilities and 
terrorism’.60 In marked contrast was an article from Russia Today, which made use of 
the same representation of hacktivists as cyberterrorists but was classified as sceptical 
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with elements of concern.
61
 Depicting a perceived American preoccupation with cyber-
threats as a thinly veiled grab for greater executive power, military spending and 
curtailing of civil liberties, this item included the following quote from independent 
journalist J.A. Myerson on the relationship between hacktivist dissent and terrorism in 
the eyes of the U.S. Government: “There is a deep insinuation that dissent is somehow 
connected to or an accessary to terror. That’s a really horrifying prospect”.62 
 
Who or what is threatened by cyberterrorism? 
Within the news items with cyberterrorism as a primary or secondary focus, a wide 
variety of referents were identified as that threatened by this newest incarnation of 
terrorism. As chart 2 indicates, the most common of these referents by some distance 
was the state itself, followed by critical infrastructures and then the private sector.
63
  
[Insert chart 2 here] 
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Table 5 examines how levels of concern about cyberterrorism varied depending on the 
threat referent. 
 
[Insert table 5 here] 
 
Three points emerge from the data presented in chart 2 and table 5. First, where 
specificity was linked to higher levels of concern in relation to the focus of news 
coverage and representations of cyberterrorists, the scale of particular referents also 
appears significant in our sample, at least. All-but-one of the items which presented ‘the 
West’ or ‘developed states’ as the referent threatened by cyberterrorism were 
categorised as concerned (with the other classed as ‘neither’). These items contained 
numerous bold assertions, including: “Power and water and other vital services in the 
West could be crippled”;64 “The fear is that modern nations are so dependent on 
technology that widespread interference with systems could wreak havoc”;65 and, “the 
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western world has, almost overnight, found itself incredibly vulnerable”.66 Of these ten 
items, five focussed on al Qaeda’s call for “cyber jihad”,67 whilst the remainder 
juxtaposed the West to countries such as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran by 
referring to past events including Stuxnet and the cyberattacks on Estonia and Georgia 
in 2007 and 2008.
68
 Similarly, all seventeen of the items which presented “the globe” as 
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the referent of the cyberterrorism threat were either concerned or concerned with 
elements of scepticism. These included a 2012 article in Russia Today following the 
discovery of the Flame malware which quoted Eugene Kaspersky as saying “I’m afraid 
it will be the end of the world as we know it … I’m scared, believe me”69 and a 2009 
article in The Guardian which reported on research conducted by the International 
Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament under the headline 
“Terrorists could use internet to launch nuclear attack”.70 A recurring theme in this 
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coverage was the importance of transnational dialogue and cooperation around cyber-
security,
71
 including the need for international cyber-security treaties.
72
 
Second, it is noteworthy that concern levels were higher when the referent was 
the private sector (85%) or critical infrastructure (74%) than when the referent was 
nation states (70%) or citizens (57%). This resonates with other research which suggests 
that there may be qualitative differences between cyberterrorism and its parent concept, 
terrorism. Whilst the latter is traditionally understood as constituted by serious levels of 
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violence against people or property, this may not be the case for cyberterrorism.
73
 For 
example, a 2011 opinion piece on Fox News by Judith Miller – which reported on an 
outage within the Research In Motion (RIM) network on which BlackBerry 
smartphones rely – opened as follows: 
 
Did you open your BlackBerry Wednesday or even Thursday morning and find – nothing? No 
new e-mails, or tweets. No new text messages. Just blackness and that familiar screen saver 
photo of your child, spouse or dog? Welcome to the world of cyber-terrorism vulnerability 
 
From this starting point, the piece went on to warn that cyberattacks “could not only 
cause billions of dollars in damage to such vital systems, but endanger national 
security” (notwithstanding the fact that RIM had attributed the outage to a core switch 
failure).
74
 Similarly, in 2011 a Reuters technology article covered a Sony shareholders’ 
meeting. The meeting took place in the aftermath of the cyberattacks on the company 
earlier that year, in which hackers accessed personal information on 77 million 
PlayStation Network and Qriocity accounts. The piece quotes Sony’s CEO Sir Howard 
Stringer as saying: 
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We believe that we first became the subject of attack because we tried to protect our IP 
(intellectual property), our content, in this case videogames … I think you see that cyber 
terrorism is now a global force, affecting many more companies than just Sony
75
  
 
Third, the referents that were associated with the lowest levels of concern were: data 
(61%); citizens (57%); and, institutions (such as NATO,
76
 the New York Stock 
Exchange
77
 and the Church of Scientology
78
) (44%). For all three of these, a significant 
proportion of news items were concerned with elements of scepticism (22%, 29% and 
22% respectively). As well as the fact that concern about these threat referents was 
more likely to be tempered in this way, it is also telling that, of the eight categories of 
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referent, institutions and citizens were the two least common. Only nine items identified 
institutions as a potential target for cyberterrorism, and even fewer identified citizens as 
one (n=7).  
Lastly, table 6 examines whether concern levels varied depending on whether 
the geographical focus of a news item was its country of publication.
79
 In other words, 
did concern levels drop when news items covered threats focused on other countries? 
  
[Insert table 6 here] 
 
Two interesting findings emerge from this data. First, for those items whose 
geographical focus was the country of publication, the proportion classified as 
concerned was only slightly higher than the equivalent figure for items whose focus was 
a country other than the one of publication. So levels of concern did not appear to drop 
to any significant extent when an item focussed on another country. This suggests an 
apprehension of the transnational and boundary-less nature of cyber threats. Second, the 
proportion of items which had an international focus that exhibited concern (76%) was 
significantly higher than in the concerned coverage which focused on specific countries. 
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This is consistent with our earlier finding that, in terms of referent, levels of concern are 
linked to the perceived scale of the threat. 
 
Specificity, status and scale: constructing the perfect storm 
It will already be apparent from the preceding discussion that multiple constructions of 
cyberterrorism are present within news media discourse. Cyberterrorists may be 
represented as hackers, hacktivists, professionals or unskilled actors. They may be 
represented as state or non-state actors. And, in addition, a range of referents are 
possible, from the entire world at one extreme to individual citizens at the other. In 
short, there is no homogeneous construction of cyberterrorism. In addition, these 
competing constructions of cyberterrorism can be presented in different ways. They 
may be presented as part of a wider threat environment which also encompasses offline 
terrorist groups and/or other types of cyber threat, or they may form the primary focus 
of a particular news item. 
The analysis hitherto has examined the links between these different 
constructions and levels of concern about the threat that cyberterrorism poses. Some 
constructions – such as those in which cyberterrorists are represented as hackers or 
hacktivists, and where the referent identified is data, citizens or institutions – are 
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associated with below average levels of concern.
80
 Other constructions, in contrast, are 
associated with above average concern levels. Based on the earlier analysis, these 
include representations of cyberterrorists as professionals or unskilled actors; and, 
stories where the threat referent is the private sector, critical infrastructure, the West or 
the entire globe. Moreover, news items with an international focus and concentrating 
primarily on cyberterrorism also appear to demonstrate an exaggerated conception of 
the cyberterrorism threat. 
Of the 535 news items examined in this study, a total of ten match this “perfect 
storm” model. Four features of these items are worthy of note. First, the items did 
indeed display above average levels of concern. Eight of the ten items were categorised 
as concerned, and a further one as concerned with elements of scepticism.
81
 Second, 
only one of the ten items was published in a tabloid newspaper. Of the other nine, six 
were published by broadcasters (Reuters (x2), Russia Today (x2), Fox News, Russia 
Today) and three by broadsheet newspapers. Indeed, the five tabloid newspapers in our 
sample were responsible for just 31 of the 400 news items that had cyberterrorism as 
their primary or secondary focus (6.2 items per outlet) compared to 129 from 
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broadcasters (14.3 items per outlet) and 240 from broadsheet newspapers (14.1 items 
per outlet). This would seem to refute suggestions that the dominant news media 
discourse on cyberterrorism (if, indeed, there is one) is solely the product of tabloid 
hyperbole.
82
 
The third striking feature of these ten items is their reliance on other sites of 
discourse. All-but-two of the items report on meetings between policymakers, industry 
and academics. Two focus on the 2012 Tel Aviv Cyber Security Conference.
83
 Two 
focus on the 2011 London Cyber Conference.
84
 The four others focus respectively on 
the 2010 Cybersecurity World Summit,
85
 the 2013 DLD Conference in Munich,
86
 a 
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2008 security conference organised by RUSI
87
 and a 2008 meeting of Government and 
technology experts in Malaysia.
88
 With headlines such as “Experts warn of 
cyberterrorism threat”,89 “Countries are risking cyber terrorism, security expert tells first 
world summit”90 and “Web security expert warns of cyber world war”91, these eight 
items are (almost entirely) descriptive overviews of speeches delivered at these events 
with relatively little express commentary or opinion. The “experts” quoted in these 
items include the UK Prime Minister David Cameron, the Malaysian Prime Minister 
Abdullah Admad Badawi, an Estonian defense ministry official, the former Director of 
the Pentagon agency responsible for computer networks, the Director-General of the 
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French network and information security agency, a former US advisor to the White 
House on cybersecurity and the Chief Research Officer at F-Secure. Moreover, the two 
items which are not primarily descriptive accounts of a conference or meeting but are 
instead discussion-based pieces which purport to assess the magnitude of the 
cyberterrorism threat also draw heavily on the opinions of “experts”, including the Head 
of the US Department of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, the Director of Research 
Programs at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Anthony Bergin and various 
academics.
92
 By far the most prominent voice, however, is that of Eugene Kaspersky. 
With warnings such as “[W]e are close, very close, to cyber terrorism. Perhaps already 
the criminals have sold their skills to the terrorists – and then … oh, God”,93 Kaspersky 
is quoted in all five items published from 2011 onwards. Whilst none of this is to 
suggest that the process of selecting, summarising and collating these views is an 
entirely objective, impartial one, the discourse in these news items is clearly rooted in 
and derived from other discursive sites. 
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It is noteworthy, finally, that six of these ten items also culminate in calls for 
greater international cooperation to enhance cybersecurity and deal with cyber threats. 
The use of hyperbole in these items may therefore – to some extent, at least – be 
understood as an attempt to overcome inertia or resistance via securitization of this 
issue. This raises clear questions for future research projects, including the motives of 
the different actors involved in this coverage.  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of international news coverage presented in this article has attempted to 
offer two primary contributions to existing literature. The first was to add empirical 
depth to existing accounts of media representations of this threat, and the importance 
thereof. As outlined above, academic literature on cyberterrorism tends to simplify and 
generalise in one of two ways. In the first instance, ‘concerned’ assessments of the 
danger it poses typically construct cyberterrorism as a monolithic, unitary security 
threat, rarely disaggregating it. ‘Sceptical’ threat assessments, in contrast, assume an 
equally homogeneous media discourse on cyberterrorism that is characterised by 
hyperbolic representations of imminent, exceptional threat. As demonstrated by our 
findings, however, media discourse on cyberterrorism is actually surprisingly 
heterogeneous. It is characterised, inter alia, by: varying levels of anxiety, stretching 
from the concerned to the sceptical; different conceptions of the identity of would-be 
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cyberterrorists; variable levels of focus on this particular phenomenon, and therefore 
different contexts into which cyberterrorism is inserted; and, a range of distinct referents 
deemed threatened by cyberterrorism. As we have shown, although two thirds of the 
coverage in our sample of 31 outlets across a five year period was concerned by the 
threat of cyberterrorism, dissenting voices were also identifiable. Similarly, while 
cyberterrorism is most frequently identified as the behaviour of professional actors or 
hackers, the label is also applied to a range of other actors including hacktivist 
collectives and unskilled individuals. And, in terms of referents identified – or 
constructed – in this coverage, there is considerable diversity from imaginary 
geopolitical spaces (‘the West’) through to individual beings (ordinary citizens) and 
inanimate entities (such as data). As this suggests, there is not one (singular, monolithic) 
news media discourse on cyberterrorism: this coverage is profoundly multiple and 
diverse. 
 The article’s second contribution was to add analytical depth to existing work on 
the content and framing of cyberterrorism discourse by highlighting the importance of 
three – hitherto neglected – factors within articulations of this threat. First, as 
demonstrated above, specificity matters, whereby news coverage that affords greater 
priority to cyberterrorism specifically tends toward a more exaggerated level of concern 
with the threat that it poses. Moreover, articles containing an explicit representation of 
‘cyberterrorists’, in our sample, also demonstrate heightened levels of concern.  
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Secondly, our analysis also pulled attention to the importance of status, 
demonstrating that particular portrayals of cyberterrorist actors led to heightened levels 
of concern.  Of particular note here, however, was the nature of this correlation and the 
discovery that the impact of status on levels of concern applied at two divergent points 
across the capability spectrum. International news coverage reported fearfully both on 
cyberterrorists deemed to be ‘professionals’ (with knowledge of how to target the most 
critical systems) and, conversely, on those deemed ‘unskilled’ (with no expertise at all 
and often a reliance on publically available software). Given the article’s desire ‘…to 
study how representations of terrorism and their reality are socially produced through 
linguistic and non-linguistic practices’94 the application of the label “cyberterrorist” 
within international news coverage both to those deemed capable of destruction 
comparable to that of the events of 9-11 and to those who send out hoax “Tweets” is of 
great significance for the construction of cyberterrorism knowledge.   
And, third, we have also shown the significance of scale in this coverage, in that 
larger referents such as ‘the West’ or ‘the globe’ tend to attract greater anxiety than 
states or individual citizens. This relation is not, however, perfect, as the private sector 
and critical infrastructure also emerge as referents of particular concern throughout our 
sample. Although it might appear intuitive that larger referents would correlate with 
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greater anxiety, there are at least two noteworthy aspects that can be drawn from this 
finding. First, the emphasis on larger referents such as these evidences a move away 
from the state as the primary referent within international media coverage of 
cyberterrorism. Given the traditional centrality of the state within terrorism discourse,
95
 
its scaling up in this instance to entire swathes of the globe is perhaps reflective of a 
broader anxiety toward threats against interconnected and potentially vulnerable 
systems. As characterised by Thomas Homer-Dixon:     
We’ve realised, belatedly, that our societies are wide-open for terrorists. We’re easy prey 
because of two key trends: First, the growing technological capacity of small groups and 
individuals to destroy things and people; and second, the increasing vulnerability of our 
economic and technological systems to carefully aimed attacks
96
 
 
Still on the point of status a second noteworthy aspect relates to the prevalence of larger 
referents and what Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum write about ‘everyday security 
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practices’.97 This particular grammar of cyber security, according to Hansen and 
Nissenbaum:  
 
…points to the way in which securitizing actors, including private organizations and businesses, 
mobilize "normal" individuals' experiences in two ways: to secure the individual's partnership 
and compliance in protecting network security, and to make hypersecuritization scenarios more 
plausible by linking elements of the disaster scenario to experiences familiar from everyday 
life
98
 
 
Issues of cybersecurity are often more relatable to the experience of the general 
citizenry and this link has aided securitizing actors in their ability to successfully 
complete securitizing moves. With this in mind one may expect the international news 
media to ‘move down’ the scale of referent objects and produce more stories with 
personal data or privacy rights as that which is under threat. However, what this article 
has found is that, contra Hansen and Nissenbaum, the international news media, far 
from covering stories with more personally relatable referent objects, in fact more 
frequently do the opposite and scale up the referent. 
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 Moving away from these analytical contributions, this article also sought to 
connect the burgeoning literature on cyberterrorism with its focus on issues of definition 
and threat to a more established body of scholarship on the construction and framing of 
terrorism (and, indeed, security) more broadly. In this context, it is of considerable 
interest to note that more specific representations of cyberterrorism tend to be associated 
with heightened levels of concern, given a widespread assumption that generalised and 
ambiguous discourses on terrorism serve (for some, deliberately) to exaggerate the 
threat that terrorism poses.
99
 As Debrix argues, discourses on cyberterrorism are in fact 
complex and internally divided, and – as the above hopefully demonstrates - much 
might be learned by breaking these down into their constituent parts: 
  
Cyberterrorism is not an evanescent, chaotic threat, even though the media would like to convey 
this image of it to the public. On the contrary, the media themselves have organized 
cyberterrorism into categories, strategies, typologies, and methodologies which make it possible 
to talk about it (as a threat, a fear, a virtual danger) and to produce more knowledge about it 
(mostly, an anticipated sense of emergency and planning).
100
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These three contributions leave us with a discourse that looks very different when 
observed along various different points of the “threat spectrum”.  Media discourse – in 
its entirety – is characterised, as shown above, by enormous diversity and heterogeneity. 
At the same time, however, when we turn attention to the most apprehensive accounts 
within international media discourse we find something far more uniform and stable.  
The ‘perfect storm’ constructions considered at the end of the article are notable not 
only for their representing the most apprehensive and cohesive part of this news media 
discourse. They also evidence considerable similarities of form, especially in relation to 
the citing of ‘expert’ knowledge from industry and beyond.  
Ultimately this article has sought to contribute to understanding of how the 
threat of cyberterrorism has been constructed by the news media in a range of different 
countries across the world. It has sought to describe and unpack more and less 
hyperbolic constructions of cyberterrorism as an effort to render visible often-neglected 
heterogeneities therein. Future research could profitably build on this work via 
comparative analysis with other media providers and types, including non-English 
language sources and citizen journalism. Other timescales both before and subsequent 
to that covered in our analysis would make a particularly interesting comparison, too, 
allowing exploration of the importance of particular events in the framing of coverage 
on cyberterrorism. More work might be done on the reception of news media discourse 
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by different audiences, and on the specific rhetorical devices employed in news 
coverage, including the role of metaphors, analogies, intertextualities and the like; as 
well as the significance of images therein. Such research would build on this article’s 
provision of a fuller and more detailed picture of the granularities of cyberterrorism 
discourse and the importance thereof. 
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